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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury convicted Tommy Cole of two counts of felony aggravated assault and one 
count of misdemeanor operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. The district 
court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years, with three years fixed, for the 
two aggravated assault counts, and retained jurisdiction. Later, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction and executed the original sentences. 
Mr. Cole appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed evidence of the statements Mr. Cole allegedly made to one of the alleged 
victims, Nicole Lowe, the day after the incident underlying the charged offenses 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), without articulating the non-propensity 
purpose for the admission of the statements. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued Mr. Cole did not show error in the 
district court's admission of Nicole Lowe's testimony about statements Mr. Cole made to 
her during a telephone call the morning after the alleged offenses. (Resp. Br., pp.11-
21.) The State also contended any error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.21-23.) This 
Reply Brief is necessary to demonstrate the State's arguments are meritless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Cole's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence of the statements 
Mr. Cole allegedly made to Ms. Lowe the day after the incident pursuant to Idaho Rule 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Evidence Of The Statements 
Mr. Cole Allegedly Made To Ms. Lowe The Day After The Incident Pursuant To Idaho 
Rule Of Evidence 404(b), Without Articulating The Non-Propensity Purpose For The 
Admission Of The Statements 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Cole asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed 
evidence of the statements Mr. Cole allegedly made to Ms. Lowe the day after the 
incident pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), because the district court did not 
articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for the admission of the statements. (See 
R, p.73; Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.12.) Thus, the district court did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards. See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52-53 
(2009). Mr. Cole's judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case should be 
remanded for a new trial. 
The State makes several arguments for why the district court did not abuse its 
discretion: (1) the district court's ruling was not based on Rule 404(b) (Resp. Br., pp.12-
15); (2) evidence of the statements was properly admitted under Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 401 and 403 (Resp. Br., pp.15-18); (3) the statements were admissible as 
admissions by a party-opponent under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2) (Resp. 
Br., pp.18-19); (4) the statements were admissible as part of the res gestae of the 
alleged offenses (Resp. Br., pp.19-20); and (5) the statements were admissible under 
Rule 404(b) because they were not propensity evidence (Resp. Br .. pp.20-21 ). The 
State also argues that even if the district court erred in admitting evidence of the 
statements, such error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.21-23.) The State's arguments 
are meritless. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Did Not Articulate The Non-
Propensity Purpose For The Admission Of The Statements 
Mr. Cole asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed evidence 
of the statements pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), because the district court 
did not articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for the admission of the 
statements. As discussed above, the district court did not articulate a non-propensity 
purpose for admitting the statements. (See Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.12.) Thus, the 
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. 
Other acts evidence is not admissible as character or propensity evidence, but 
may be admissible for other purposes. I.R.E. 404(b). 1 As discussed in the Appellant's 
Brief (App. Br., pp.10-11 ), the Idaho Supreme Court in Grist held: "Admissibility of 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose is 
subject to a two-tiered analysis." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. For the second step of the first 
tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis-the determination that the other act would 
be relevant-the trial court must articulate the purpose or purposes, other than 
propensity, for admission of the evidence. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52-53; State v. Parmer, 
147 Idaho 210, 215-16 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The district court in this case did not articulate the purpose, other than 
propensity, for admission of the statements. (See Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.12.) The 
district court therefore did not satisfy the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) 
1 Rule 404(b), in relevant part, provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident .... " I.RE. 404(b). 
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admissibility analysis. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 216. Thus, the 
district court abused its discretion when it allowed the evidence of the statements, 
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
1. Even Under The State's Argument That The District Court's Ruling Was 
Not Based On Rule 404(b), The District Court Still Abused Its Discretion 
Because It Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards 
The State argues that the district court's ruling allowing the evidence of the 
statements was not based on Rule 404(b). (Resp. Br., pp.12-15.) However, accepting 
the State's argument would still mean the district court abused its discretion by not 
acting consistently with the applicable legal standards, because the district court was 
required to conduct a full Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis once Mr. Cole objected to 
the evidence of the statements under Rule 404(b). 
As the Grist Court held, when determining the admissibility of other acts 
evidence, the trial court "must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish the other crime or wrong as fact," and "must also determine whether the fact of 
another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant" to a non-propensity purpose. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. The trial court must then determine whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence under Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 403. Id. The trial court must engage in this full analysis "[w]hen 
determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule 404(b) objection has been 
made." State v. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho 867, 871 (Ct App. 2013); see also State v. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008) (holding, with respect to the notice requirement of 
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Rule 404(b), that "compliance with I.RE 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent 
admission of other acts evidence"). 
Even under the State's argument that the district court's ruling was not based on 
Rule 404(b), the district court abused its discretion because it did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards. Mr. Cole objected to the evidence of the statements 
under Rule 404(b) in his second motion in limine and at the hearing on the motions in 
limine. (R, p.67; Tr., p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.5.) Once Mr. Cole made the Rule 404(b) 
objection to the evidence of the statements, the district court had to engage in a Rule 
404(b) admissibility analysis. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho at 871; see Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; 
Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 216. If the district court did not base its ruling on Rule 404(b) 
as the State argues, then the district court did not engage in the required Rule 404(b) 
analysis. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by not acting consistently with the 
applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600. The State's argument to the 
contrary is meritless. 
2. The State's Arguments On Rules 401 And 403, Rule 801 (d)(2), And 
Res Gestae Are Without Merit 
The State's other arguments on why the district court did not err are likewise 
meritless. The State argues the evidence of the statements was admissible under 
Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 4032 because the evidence was relevant and the 
2 Rule 401 provides that '"Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401. 
Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." I.RE. 403. 
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probative value of the statements was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. (Resp. Br., pp.15-18.) However, even under this argument the district 
court only engaged in a partial admissibility analysis. Relevance and balancing 
probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice are only two parts of the full 
admissibility analysis for other acts evidence under Rule 404(b). See Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 52. Again, the district court was required to determine not just that the evidence was 
relevant, but that it was "relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged, other than propensity." Id. Further, the district court should have conducted 
the Rule 403 balancing only after determining the evidence of the statements was 
relevant to a non-propensity purpose. See id. 
The district court did not articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for 
admission of the statements (see R., p.73; Tr., p.18, L.15 p.19, L.12), and thus did not 
satisfy the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis. See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 216. Thus, even if the district court 
determined the evidence was relevant and that the probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, it abused its discretion by not articulating 
a non-propensity purpose for the evidence of the statements pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53 (vacating and remanding a case because the district court 
did not determine there was sufficient evidence to establish prior misconduct as fact or 
articulate a non-propensity purpose for the prior misconduct, even though the district 
court determined the prior misconduct was relevant and the probative value would 
substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice). The State's argument that the 
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district court did not err where the district court only engaged in a partial admissibility 
analysis is meritless. 
Although Mr. Cole never made a hearsay challenge to the statements (see 
R., p.67; Tr., p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.5), the State further argues the statements were 
admissible because they were admissions by a party-opponent under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2). (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) But nonhearsay testimony like statements 
of a party-opponent "may be excluded on other grounds, such as if the testimony 
constitutes propensity evidence under I.R E. 404(b)." Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 
779 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, even if the statements were statements of a party-opponent, 
the district court still had to engage in a full admissibility analysis pursuant to Rule 
404(b). See id. ('Trial courts are required to undertake a two-tiered analysis to 
determine whether other-acts evidence is inadmissible propensity evidence under Rule 
404(b) or whether the evidence could be admitted for some other purpose.") Because 
the district court did not articulate a non-propensity purpose for the evidence of the 
statements, it abused its discretion. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; Hedger, 115 Idaho 
at 600. 
The State cites State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104 (Ct. App. 1995), in support of its 
argument on admissions by a party-opponent. (Resp. Br., p.19.) However, Martinez is 
distinguishable from the present case because the statements by a party-opponent in 
Martinez were not challenged under Rule 404(b). See Martinez, 128 Idaho at 107-08. 
The State's argument that the statements were admissible simply because they were 
statements by a party-opponent is without merit. 
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The State's argument that the statements were admissible as part of the res 
gestae of the alleged offenses (Resp. Br., pp.19-20), is also without merit, because the 
State relies on an incomplete picture of res gestae. As the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
in one of the cases quoted by the State, "res gestae or the 'complete story principle' is 
an exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other misconduct evidence on/ywhere the 
charged act and the uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be 
given a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the 
uncharged misconduct." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(emphasis added). However, the State neglected to mention that the Blackstead Court 
additionally held that "[i]n this context, res gestae refers to other acts that occur during 
the commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be 
described to 'complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of 
nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings."' Id. at 18 (quoting 1 Kenneth S. 
Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence§ 190, at 799 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992)). 
Similarly, while the State also quoted the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667 (1975) (Resp. Br., p.19), the State failed to include the Izatt 
Court's language on how the complete story principle provides that 
when several criminal acts are so connected with the defendant, with 
respect to time and locality, that they form an inseparable transaction, and 
a complete account of the offense charged in the indictment cannot be 
given without detailing the particulars of such other acts, evidence of the 
entire transaction is admissible, even though it may disclose the 
commission of another crime. 
Izatt, 96 Idaho at 670 ( quoting State v. Sikes, 427 P .2d 756, 757 (Or. 1967) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Based on a complete picture of res gestae, the Blackstead Court held evidence 
drug use by a defendant and the alleged victims that occurred several days after the 
first charged act of lewd conduct and several weeks before the second charged act was 
not admissible as part of the res gestae. Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19. The drug use 
"bore no immediate temporal connection to either of the charged acts of lewd conduct" 
and its presentation was not "necessary to give the jury a complete story of the 
commission of the crimes." Id. 
Conversely, the Blackstead Court held evidence of drug use by the defendant 
and one alleged victim "shortly before" the first charged act and his gift of marijuana to 
her "immediately thereafter" were part of the res gestae, because they "were 
inextricably connected with the charged sexual offense." Id. at 18. The drug use "was 
part of the immediate interaction" between the defendant and the alleged victim, and 
"[d]isclosure of the drug use was necessary in order to give the jury a full explanation of 
how the sexual conduct came about." Id. The Izatt Court similarly held, in a case 
involving a rape charge against the defendant, that evidence of a co-defendant forcing 
the alleged victim to engage in fellatio was part of the res gestae for the rape charge. 
Izatt, 96 Idaho at 669-70. The alleged victim in Izatt testified the co-defendant forced 
her to engage in fellatio in the same half-hour period he forced her to engage in sexual 
intercourse, immediately before the defendant forced the alleged victim to engage in 
sexual intercourse with him. Id. at 669. 
In light of Izatt and Blackstead, the State's very argument that the statements 
"are all part of the res gestae of the crimes [Mr. Cole] committed the previous evening" 
(Resp. Br., p.18), actually indicates the statements are not part of the res gestae. The 
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statements were allegedly made to Ms. Lowe on October 19, 2012, the day after the 
incident. (Notice of Intent to Introduce Certain Evidence at Trial, Jan 30, 2014, p.3.) 
Mr. Cole reportedly stated that he was in Clarkston, Washington (See Notice of Intent 
to Introduce Certain Evidence at Trial, p.3.) It cannot be said that statements made the 
day after the incident and from another state were "acts that occur during the 
commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be 
described to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby 
and nearly contemporaneous happenings." See Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Like the drug use several days or weeks removed from the 
charged offenses in Blackstead, the statements here "bore no immediate temporal 
connection to either of the charged acts." See id. at 19. Further, because the 
statements were distant in time and place from the incident, presentation of evidence of 
the statements was not "necessary to give the jury a complete story of the commission 
of the crimes." See id. 
While the State "is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the 
circumstances of the commission of the crime," Izatt, 96 Idaho at 670, res gestae does 
not give the State license to complete the story by offering evidence of happenings that 
are neither nearby nor nearly contemporaneous. See Bfackstead, 126 Idaho at 18-19. 
By presenting an incomplete picture of the complete story principle, the State appears 
to argue for an expansion of res gestae to include evidence that merely "directly 
relate[s]" to the charged offenses. (See Resp. Br., p.20.) But removing the 
requirements of immediate proximity in time and place to the commission of the crime, 
as the State would have it, would distort res gestae beyond all recognition. See 
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Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18. The State's argument relies on an incomplete picture of 
res gestae and is without merit. 
The State's above arguments are meritless. Because the district court did not 
articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for admission of the statements, the 
district court did not satisfy the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) 
admissibility analysis. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 216. Thus, the 
district court abused its discretion when it allowed the evidence of the statements, 
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115 
Idaho at 600. 
C. Under Grist. The District Court's Abuse Of Discretion Requires That Mr. Cole's 
Judgment Of Conviction Be Vacated And The Case Be Remanded For A 
New Trial 
Mr. Cole asserts that, under Grist, because the district court abused its discretion 
when it did not articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for admission of the 
statements, his judgment of conviction must be vacated and the case must be 
remanded for a new trial. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. 
The State argues that the evidence of the statements was not propensity 
evidence under Rule 404(b) and was thus not subject to exclusion. (Resp. Br., pp.20-
21.) This argument is meritless. While the State offers several purported non-
propensity purposes for the statements (see Resp. Br., pp.20-21), Grist nonetheless 
requires that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial 
without determining admissibility. 
As discussed above, the district court in Grist "did not determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence to establish as fact" the prior misconduct, "nor did the district 
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court articulate whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the 
of existence of a common scheme or plan or because it tended to otherwise 
corroborate [an alleged victim's] testimony." Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. In other words, the 
district court did not "carefully scrutinize" the evidence "in order to avoid the erroneous 
introduction of evidence that is merely probative of the defendant's propensity to 
engage in criminal behavior." See id. The Grist Court therefore vacated the judgment 
of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, without deciding whether the 
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b): "We do not decide the admissibility of the 
evidence at issue in this case. The district court will make that determination on remand 
in exercise of its discretion." Id. 
By not articulating the non-propensity purpose for the evidence of the 
statements, the district court here also did not carefully scrutinize the evidence. As the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held in Parmer, "'[s]uch careful examination for the requisite 
factual similarities is not just limited to cases where Rule 404(b) evidence is offered to 
show a common scheme or plan, but must be conducted when evidence is offered for 
any purpose under Rule 404(b)." Parmer, 147 Idaho at 219. Because the district court 
did not articulate the non-propensity purpose for admitting the statements, the judgment 
of conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new trial. See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. The State's argument on the admissibility of the statements as 
non-propensity evidence fails because, under Grist, this Court would not decide 
admissibility before vacating the judgment or conviction and remanding the case. See 
id. Rather, the district court would determine admissibility on remand in exercise of its 
discretion. See id. 
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Thus, the State's argument on this point is meritless. Under Grist, Mr. Cole's 
judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a 
new trial. 
D. Alternatively, The State Has Not Proven That The District Court's Abuse Of 
Discretion Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Alternatively, even if Mr. Cole's judgment of conviction is not vacated and the 
case is not remanded under Grist,3 Mr. Cole asserts his judgment of conviction should 
be vacated and the case should be remanded because the State has not proven the 
district court's abuse of discretion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
State's arguments that the error was harmless are meritless. 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate 
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. 
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
The State has not proven the district court's abuse of discretion was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues the error was harmless because the 
State "presented overwhelming evidence of [Mr.] Cole's guilt." (Resp. Br., p.22.) That 
3 Grist was decided before the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the standards for 
objected-to and unobjected-to errors in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
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is the incorrect standard. The appellate court's inquiry, where the State has the burden 
of providing beyond a reasonable doubt the error is harmless, "is not whether, in a trial 
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
error." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 279 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The State has not proven the district court's abuse of discretion was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, because there was a reasonable possibility the propensity 
evidence admitted in the form of the statements contributed to the conviction. In other 
words, the jury verdict on the charges cannot be said to be "surely unattributable to the 
error." See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted) The evidence of 
the alleged statements was highly prejudicial. As the Idaho Supreme Court warned in 
Grist, the statements as propensity evidence likely took "the jury away from their 
primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial." See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Because the statements included Mr. Cole's alleged threat that 
he would blow Ms. Lowe's head off (see Tr., p.185, Ls.5-6), they probably induced the 
jury to believe that Mr. Cole was more likely to have committed the crimes on trial 
because he was a man of criminal character. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
As discussed in the Appellant's Brief (see App. Br., pp.16-17), the State's 
highlighting of the statements during its opening statement and closing argument 
probably reinforced that impression. The State during its opening statement 
summarized Ms. Lowe's projected testimony on the statements. (Tr., p.126, L.14 -
15 
127, L.7.) In its closing argument, the State invited the jury to consider Mr. Cole's 
"audacity to call the next day." (Tr., p.295, L.13 - p.296, L.3.) 
The lack of a limiting instruction requiring the jury to only consider the statements 
for a non-propensity purpose heightened the prejudice. Mr. Cole did not request a 
limiting instruction.4 (See Tr., p.269, L.13 - p.270, L.8.) But because the district court 
did not articulate the purpose, other than propensity, for admission of the statements 
(see Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.12), the district court could not have limited the jury's 
consideration of the statements to a non-propensity purpose even if Mr. Cole had 
requested a limiting instruction. Without a limiting instruction, there were no barriers 
against the jury considering the statements as propensity evidence, leaving the jury free 
to "believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is 
a man of criminal character." See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Thus, even if the evidence 
were admissible for a non-propensity purpose as the State argues (see Resp. 
Br., pp.20-21 ), Mr. Cole was likely prejudiced because the jury was free to treat the 
statements as propensity evidence. 
As examined in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., pp.18-19), the weakness of the 
State's case also indicates there is a reasonable possibility the district court's abuse of 
discretion contributed to the conviction. There were reasons to doubt the credibility of 
the State's witnesses, because there were inconsistencies in their stories on whether 
Mr. Cole went into the bar and what Deputy Roberts told them. ( See App. Br., pp.18-
19.) Thus, as propensity evidence, the statements bolstered the State's weak case and 
4 Mr. Cole would again clarify that, because he did not request a limiting instruction, he 
does not assert on appeal that the district court's failure to give a limiting instruction was 
itself an error. 
16 
probably induced the jury to believe Mr. Cole was more likely to have committed the 
crimes on trial because he was a man of criminal character. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
As shown above, the State's arguments on harmlessness are without merit. The 
State has not proven that the district court's abuse of discretion was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Thus, Mr. Cole's judgment of 
conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons presented in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Cole respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand the case to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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